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Lebanon: Iran's Financial Safe Haven

A SOVEREIGN MONEY LAUNDERING SCHEME



# The Strength of Lebanon's Economy and the Strength of its Sovereign Debt is Inexplicable and an International Outlier

- Lebanon's Tenuous Politics
- 2. By Traditional Indicators, Lebanon's Economy is in Shambles
- 3. Lebanese Sovereign Debt Suspiciously Trades at Low Yields with No Rational Economic Explanation
- 4. Credit Default Swaps to Insure its Sovereign Debt Trade at Very Low Premiums
  - 5. Where is the Investment Demand for Lebanese Bonds Coming From?
    - 6. Next Steps & U.S. Government Action



### 1. Lebanon's Tenuous Politics

### **Country Overview**





#### General

Population	4.2 million
Area	10,450 sq km
Languages	Arabic, English, French
Borders	Syria, Israel, Mediterranean Sea
Nationality	Sunni, Shia, Christian
Capital	Beirut

#### **Political Structure**

Political Parties	Organized on sectarian basis The "March 14" alliance is headed by the Future Movement (Sunni) with the Lebanese Forces (Christian) in loose alliance with the Progressive Socialist Party (Druze) and the Phalange (Christian) The "March 8" block comprises Hezbollah (Shia), Amal (Shia) and Free
Form of State  Prime Minister	Patriotic Movement (Christian)  Parliamentary republic The national assembly has 128 seats equally divided between Muslims and Christians Najib Mikati (Sunni)
President Next Elections	Michael Suliman (Maronite Christian) June 2013

#### **Economic Data**

	Lebanese Lira/Pound (LBP)
Currency	The LBP is kept at a tight exchange
	rate band to the USD
GDP	US\$38.5 billion
Gross Government Debt	US\$53.8 billion
Growth	8.1% average 2007-2010
Glowin	Expected 1.5% in 2011
GDP Per Capita	US\$15,600
Main Industries	Banking, tourism

Source: CIA World Factbook

### Lebanon's Politics & its False Economy



#### A Precarious Political Situation

- Severe domestic political tensions with a Hezbollah-dominated cabinet
- Heavily influenced by the neighboring political conflict in Syria
- Upcoming elections in June 2013

#### Deceiving the Markets & Artificially Stabilized Sovereign Debt

- Real risk of Lebanese debt not accurately reflected in the markets
  - Unstable economy with severe debt burden one of the highest in the world
  - Lebanon unable to reduce budget deficit with declining underlying growth
- Lebanese sovereign bond pricing does not reflect these major issues
  - Sovereign default has artificially maintained a low-risk profile
- Evidence of third party (Iran/Syria) influence, and/or corruption artificially propping up the Lebanese economy

### A Precarious Political Situation

The potential for political instability creates a downside risk to GDP growth and to the overall economy.

- Entrenched in sectarian tensions keep market reforms slow and cautious
  - Cabinet composed largely of Hezbollah members ("March 8th" alliance), supported by Iran and Syria
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- "March 8<sup>th</sup>" and "March 14<sup>th</sup>" have about even allocations in parliament with elections in 2013
- Political crisis in Syria will have an important bearing on the balance of power in Lebanon
  - Civil uprising against Bashar al-Assad's regime has led to increased violence in Syria
  - Lebanon abstained from voting on the Arab League sanctions against Syria
  - As more Syrians flee to Lebanon, there is increasing risk of spillover
- Despite relative government stability following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, unity remains precarious
  - UN investigation calls for the arrest of four Hezbollah members
  - The Lebanese government only agreed recently to hold to its part of financing the investigation
- Potential armed conflict with Israel
  - Hezbollah has rearmed after the 2006 conflict with Israel
  - An Israel-Iran conflict could draw in Hezbollah as a local proxy for Iran
- Relations with moderate allies impaired
  - Politicians aligned with the Assad regime may face censure from Arab allies in post-Assad world
  - U.S., France and Saudi Arabia, who support the "March 14" block will remain wary of Hezbollah's influence in Lebanon




## 2. By Traditional Indicators, Lebanon's Economy is in Shambles





#### **Lebanese Government Debt**

#### Lebanese Government Debt to GDP




Lebanon has consistently increased its public debt level over the last 10 years.





#### **Debt to GDP – The International Benchmark**



Lebanon has the fourth largest debt to GDP ratio in the world, higher than several of the most distressed economies in the world such as Ireland and Italy.


### A Country that Carries a High Budget Deficit, Heavily Impacted by its Debt Burden




#### **Budget and Deficit**

USDmm	Dec-02	Dec-03	Dec-04	Dec-05	Dec-06	Dec-07	Dec-08	Dec-09	Dec-10	Sep-10	Sep-11
Revenue	3,587	4,132	4,701	4,641	4,577	5,378	6,508	7,998	7,986	5,853	6,604
General expenditure	2,568	2,615	2,847	2,836	3,239	3,409	3,773	6,113	5,960	4,366	4,892
Debt service	3,071	3,239	2,672	2,348	3,028	3,282	3,294	3,843	3,916	2,967	2,785
Total expenditure	5,639	5,854	5,519	5,184	6,267	6,691	7,067	9,956	9,876	7,332	7,677
Deficit	(2,052)	(1,722)	(818)	(544)	(1,690)	(1,313)	(559)	(1,959)	(1,890)	(1,479)	(1,073)
GDP	19,184	20,117	21,775	21,524	22,218	25,061	29,646	34,620	37,104		
%deficit / Expenditure	36.4%	29.4%	14.8%	10.5%	27.0%	19.6%	7.9%	19.7%	19.1%	20.2%	14.0%
% deficit / GDP	10.7%	8.6%	3.8%	2.5%	7.6%	5.2%	1.9%	5.7%	5.1%		

#### Deficit as % of GDP and Debt Service



#### **Breakdown of Revenue and Deficit**



Source: Lebanon Ministry of Finance

### Struggling to Reduce the Budget Deficit

The politically entrenched process has prohibited material economic progress.

The Lebanese government has struggled to pass budgets for the last 5 years due to political disputes and external conflicts




- 2012 budget is now before the cabinet
- 2012 budget includes contentious tax increases which would help pull in revenue but may prevent budget from being passed
- Tax increase are expected to impose additional burden on the weaker social layers
- The electricity sector is in bad shape and in dire need of reform
  - The country continues to suffer from power shortages, particularly in the summer months
  - A large investment program was recently approved by the cabinet for US\$5 billion
- Privatization initiatives aimed at freeing up government resources are not moving forward
  - Private sector sees high political risk in Lebanon and has lowered demand for privatized assets
  - Infrastructure development in partnership with the private sector is slow
- Government income from the telecom sector is booked in its fiscal statistics based on expected surplus rather than actual transfers
  - Expected income is not a reliable for debt servicing

### A Country with a Consistent Current Account Deficit




#### **Trade Statistics**

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Export (\$m)	1,045	1,524	1,747	1,880	2,282	2,816	3,478	3,484	4,253
Import (\$m)	6,445	7,168	9,397	9,340	9,398	11,815	16,137	16,242	17,964
Current acount deficit (\$m)	5,400	5,644	7,650	7,460	7,116	8,999	12,659	12,758	13,711
GDP (\$bn)	19.18	20.12	21.78	21.52	22.22	25.06	29.65	34.62	37.10
%CA deficit/import %CA deficit/GDP	83.8% 28.1%	78.7% 28.1%	81.4% 35.1%	79.9% 34.7%	75.7% 32.0%	76.2% 35.9%	78.4% 42.7%	78.5% 36.9%	76.3% 37.0%









Source: Lebanon Ministry of Finance









- The Lebanese economy is facing a material slowdown in GDP growth
  - "After four years of strong growth, Lebanon's economy has lost momentum, reflecting domestic political uncertainty and regional unrest..." (IMF, November 2011)
- Lebanon's growth prospects will depend upon regional performance as Arab states are the principal consumer of Lebanon's service-oriented economy
  - Unrest in the region impacts tourism in Lebanon; tourists are primarily from Arab countries and have chosen more stable destinations like Turkey or Morocco
  - Tourism indirectly supports ¼ of jobs and generates much of the demand for construction
- Heavy government borrowing and limited price competition suggests that banks' prime lending rates will remain prohibitively
  expensive for small and medium businesses, putting pressure on real economic growth
- Lebanese growth will continue to struggle and all signs point to even higher risk of sovereign debt default



### 3. Lebanese Sovereign Debt Suspiciously Trades at Low Yields with No Rational Economic Explanation

## Lebanon's Weak Economy and Political Situation is Reflected in its Weak Credit Rating



#### Lebanon's Rating

	Long Term	Short Term	Outlook
Moody's	B1	-	Stable
S&P	В	В	Stable
Fitch	В	В	Stable

"The ratings are constrained by our view of Lebanon's high public debt burden, large external imbalances, and the risk of a breakdown of the current consensus in the government..."

"...key source of political tension at present is the U.N. Special International Tribunal's investigation into the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri...could ultimately cause Hezbollah to withdraw from the government. We believe that this would severely undermine prospects for sustainable growth and political stability..."

"Lebanon's current account deficit, which stands at over 20% of GDP, remains in our view a source of vulnerability and we believe its financing will remain highly reliant on continued investor confidence over the medium term."

S&P, November 2010

### Selected Comparable Country Ratings & Cost of Debt

				10yr Bond Yield
	Moody's	S&P	Fitch	(4/17/12)
Bulgaria	Baa3	BBB	BBB-	- 1
Egypt	Ba3	BB	BB	6.9 or 8.2
Gabon	-	BB-	BB-	4.250
Georgia	Ba3	B+	B+	5.650
Ghana	-	В	B+	-
Greece	С	CCC	B-	-
Indonesia	Ba1	BB+	BB+	6.050
Ireland	Ba1	BBB+	BBB+	6.800
Israel	A1	A+	Α	3.950
Jamaica	B3	B-	B-	7.500
Jordan	Ba2	BB	-	- I
Lebanon	B1	В	В	5.400
Lithuania	Baa1	BBB	BBB-	5.800
Nigeria	-	B+	BB-	-
Philippines	Ba2	BB	BB+	3.100
Senegal	B1	B+	· , · , · = , · , ,	7.450
Spain	A3	AA-	AA-	5.850
Sri Lanka	-	B+	BB-	5.950
Turkey	Ba2	BB	BB+	5.100
Ukraine	B2	B+	В	9.450
Vietnam	B1	BB	B+	5.250



#### **Lebanese Historic Cost of Debt**

#### Cost of Debt 2005-2007



#### Cost of Debt in 2012



Historically, cost of Lebanese sovereign debt was much higher in 2006 and 2007 (~9%) than is it today (~5% to 6%).






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Lebanon government bonds trade at high cash prices, reflecting spreads even lower than applicable CDS\* spreads, falsely suggesting that these bonds are backed by a more robust economy than that of Lebanon.


#### **Lebanon Government Bond Trading Stats**

				-	,
				Benchmark	
Maturity	Coupon	Price	Yield	Yield	Spread
3/25/2014	6.00%	105.1	304	27	277
5/2/2014	9.00%	111.2	306	27	279
4/22/2015	6.00%	106.2	365	41	324
7/15/2015	6.00%	106.3	376	41	335
11/30/2015	6.00%	106.3	397	41	356
1/19/2016	8.50%	114.6	410	87	323
5/11/2016	<b>1</b> 1.63%	127.0	413	87	326
3/20/2017	9.00%	118.9	454	87	367
11/12/2018	5.15%	100.6	496	87	409
11/28/2019	5.45%	100.7	526	201	325
4/12/2021	8.25%	118.9	548	201	348
10/4/2022	6.10%	102.5	572	201	371




Recently and counter to intuition, both CDS and cash bonds are going up.

#### **Sovereign Bonds Trade Well**



#### **Lebanon CDS Spreads Are Range-Bound**

■Government bond spread ■CDS spread



<sup>\*</sup>Credit Default Swaps (CDS): A financial swap designed to transfer the credit exposure of fixed income products between parties. The buyer of a CDS receives credit protection, and the seller of a swap guarantees the credit worthiness of the debt security.

Source: Bloomberg
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


## 4. Credit Default Swaps to Insure its Sovereign Debt Trade at Very Low Premiums

## Premium to Insurance Against Sovereign Default Suspiciously Remains at Low Levels



Lebanon 5 Year Credit Default Swap (CDS) Spread Levels




In spite of severe risk indicators, the market registers Lebanese CDS as less risky.



### Low CDS Levels Difficult to Justify

#### **5 Year CDS Spreads of Selected Countries**



<sup>\*</sup> Excluding recent movement due to default. Data as of 03/28/2012.




## 5. Where is the Investment Demand for Lebanese Bonds Coming From?


## Unexplained Inflows into Lebanon's Commercial Banking System




#### Bank's Claim on Public Sector vs. Debt



#### **Split of Subscriptions in Recent Auction**



#### **Bank Asset Split**




- The commercial banking system has been the leading factor in the demand for government bonds both in local and foreign currency
- Over the last few years, the Lebanese commercial banks have enjoyed material inflows of deposits. Those deposits, however, carry a relatively high interest rate and need to be put to work (LBP savings account at 2.59% and LBP checking/current accounts at 0.91%). A significant portion goes to buying government bonds.
- The fact that cash bonds trade at significantly tighter spreads than CDS supports the notion that Lebanese bonds are inflated by significant inflows of funds into the banking system rather than fundamental investment analysis.

Source: Banque du Liban



### **Increasing Money Supply**


A clear gradual increase in money supply. Where is it coming from?



## Increased Inflows Coinciding with the Syrian Conflict?



#### **Foreign Currency Deposits in Lebanon of Non-Residents**




The increase in inflows has likely been partially influenced by the Syrian conflict. However, the increase of foreign currency deposits appear to more closely follow other events...

## Increased Inflows Coincides with Sanctions Against Iran



#### **Foreign Currency Deposits in Lebanon of Non-Residents**




The increase in inflows coincides with the adoption of more robust Iran sanctions, indicating a likely relationship.

Source: Banque du Liban www.uani.com



### A Sovereign Money Laundering Scheme

#### **The Iran-Lebanon Connection**





### 6. Next Steps & U.S. Government Action

### Rating Agencies Should Issue a 'No Rating' for Lebanese Bonds



- A bond credit rating assesses the credit worthiness of a corporation's or a government's debt issues
- Rating agencies that issue any kind of rating (either 'investment grade' or 'junk bonds') help to legitimize the exchange of these artificially stable bonds
- UANI calls upon all credit rating agencies to withdraw ratings for Lebanese bonds due to their fraudulent values
  - Without an official rating, no reputable institution would purchase such bonds
  - Without an official rating, no institution can justify the purchase of Lebanese bonds to its clients
  - A 'no rating' will drive buyers and sellers out of the Lebanese bond market
- Further, there is already an extremely small ownership level by foreign institutions of Lebanese bonds

#### Lebanese Sovereign Bonds

Total Bonds Outstanding	\$ 21,559,668,069.90
Total Bonds Foreign Owned	\$ 559,892,335.00
% Foreign Owned	2.60%

Source: Bloomberg, figures as of April 9, 2012

### Lebanese Bond Holders & Firms Facilitating Transactions

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- Institutions that engage in the buying and selling of Lebanese bonds help legitimize this debt instrument as a serious investment
- By investing in Lebanese bonds, institutions facilitate the Iranian regime in hiding large amounts of hard currency in the Lebanese banking system
  - Providing a safe haven for Iranian currency as the regime actively pursues an illicit nuclear program, supports terrorism and is responsible for egregious human rights abuses
- Firms cannot justify holding/facilitating transactions of junk-rated Lebanese bonds that have been artificially valued as a sovereign money laundering enterprise
- UANI calls on all such firms to divest from Lebanese sovereign debt and to end its transaction services for these bonds and CDS

	ved Parties of Bond Transaction
	sleiman & Partners
	Audi SAE
Bank	of America Merrill Lynch
Bank	of Beirut
	of New York
Bank	of New York London
	ue Audi Sal
	ue de la Mediterranee Sal
Banq	ue Libanaise pour le Commerce
Banqı	ue Mediterranne
BLON	1 Bank SAL
BNP	Paribas
BNP	Paribas/London
Byblo	s Bank
Citigr	oup Global Markets Ltd
Credit	: Libanais SAL
Credit	Suisse First Boston (Europe)
Credit	Suisse First Boston Corp
Credit	Suisse First Boston Ltd
Credit	Suisse Securities USA LLC
Deuts	che Bank AG
Deuts	che Bank AG London
Deuts	che Bank Luxembourg SA
Deuts	che Bank Securities Inc
Deuts	che Bank Trust Company America
Dewe	y & LeBoeuf LLP
Dewe	y Ballantine LLP/London
El Kh	oury & Partners
Frans	abank SAL
Fresh	fields Bruckhaus Deringer
	Bank PLC
HSBC	Holdings
Lebar	nese Canadian Bank
LeBo	euf Lamb Greene & Macrae LLP
Merril	Lynch International
	an Stanley & Co International
	Abdel-Malek
Socie	te Generale
Stanc	lard Chartered Bank

	MM.
Lebanese Bond Holders	
Advanced Series Trust	
AGF Management Limited	
Aktia Fund Management Ltd	
Aletti Gestielle SGR SPA	
American Life Insurance Company	
Amundi	
Aviva Funds Sicav	
Blackrock Asset Management	
Blackrock Fund Advisors	
BNP Paribas Asset Management SG	
Consultinvest Asset Management	
Deka International SA	
Eaton Vance Advisors Ireland Lt	
Erste Sparinvest Kagmbh	
Eurizon Capital SA	
Fidelity Investments Canada Ltd	
Fidelity Management & Research	
Fideuram Gestions SA	
GE Asset Management	
GE Asset Management Incorporate	
Hartford Life & Accident Ins Co	
HSBC Investment Funds Inc	
Interfund Advisory Co SA	
JP Morgan Investment Management	
Jyske Invest	
Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch	
Mackay Shields Financial Corp	
Nationwide Fund Advisors	
Neuberger Berman LLC	
Nord Est Asset Management SA	
Normura Asset Management Co. Ltd.	
Price T Rowe Associates Inc	
RBC Global Investment Management Inc	;.
Riversource Investments LLC	
San Paolo IMI Asset Management	
SEI Investments Fund Management	
Sparinvest	
Sparinvest Fondsmaeglerselskab	
T Rowe Price Global Asset Managemen	t
T Rowe Price Global Investment Manage	ment
Thrivent Financial Lutherans	
Union Bancaire Privee	
Union Investment Luxembourg SA	
Universal Investment Lux SA	
Source: Bloomberg as of March 30, 2012	